After 80 years under French domination, 20 years of civil war, 15 years of xenophobic isolation and entanglement in the Soviet economic web and ten years as a lost Marxist nation adrift in a world that has turned its back on communism, Vieät Nam has reached a crucial crossroads. Will it become another Thailand or a gradually evolving China, or will it regress like Cambodia or Laos? Of the five countries divided by the Second War World and the Cold War – the others are the two Germanies, the two Koreas, the two Yemens, and China/Taiwan - Vieät Nam was the first to be reunified. Its political achievements are notable. Economically and democratically however, it is at the same level as Cuba and North Korea.

For tactical reasons, the Vietnamese authorities are desperately trying to maintain equal relations between China and the United States. Inside the country, they live with thousands of contradictions. They say they are the legal representatives of the Vietnamese working class but live in constant fear of a popular uprising. In 1975, the country was reunified during what is known as the forced "northernization" of South Vieät Nam. A Western-style democracy movement born in the South is threatening to engulf the North, a phenomenon known as "southernization". The greatest paradox is this: to shore up the crumbling government, Vieät Nam’s leaders are renovating the economy with the help of both Karl Marx and Adam Smith, and calling this hotchpotch "free economy under socialist guidance". Inside the Politburo, two sides vie for control, the conservatives and the reformists.

The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) only has 2.5 million registered members, but it has 80 million Vietnamese under its control. The Party, the Government and the National Assembly are manipulated by the same puppeteers. In 1997, the 19 members of the Politburo decided on a compromise, the troika of Phan Vaên Khaûi, the reformist prime minister from the South, Leâ Khaõ Phieâu, secretary general of the party and an Army man from Central Vieät Nam, and Traàn Ñöùc Löông, head of state and a moderate northerner. According to rumors, Phieâu who currently has the upper hand, is plotting to get the 9^th Plenum of the VCP at its next session in March 2001 to make him head of state while also retaining his current leadership of the Party. In case of a disagreement, important decisions require a unanimous vote from the Politburo. Often, this is enough to paralyze the whole government – for instance, during the trade agreement negotiations with the United States. Since the 8^th Plenum five years ago, the administration has been functioning in slow motion, or sometimes not at all, because of disagreements within the Politburo.

Renovation is thus a necessity. But how? Through revolution or evolution? Many analysts predict that the old men of Hanoi will make way, sooner or later, to a new generation, a trend precipitated by economic globalization and the new information technology. Although it is true that the "senior generation" – the French speaking men who contributed to national reunification – will soon exit the stage, the next generation, the 40, 50, 60 year olds, have started replacing them and are in no hurry to give up their powers and privileges. This "middle generation" was trained in Moscow and other capitals of the Soviet bloc, and remains devoted to the VCP. The "junior generation" who grew up in a freer environment in the last decade will have to wait its turn. Within this group, the competition among the sons and daughters of PCV loyalists for party privileges will be fierce.

According to the communist daily Nhaân Daân, a survey of which issues are of greatest concern to the youth – in higher education or otherwise – was made public by Hanoi in 1993. They listed, in order of priority, the necessity for reforms, economic reorganization, greater overture to the outside world. Patriotism ranks fifth, proving that the party’s old line about patriotism and loyalty to socialism has lost its power, and only 7.6% said they were interested in politics (this may be due to the respondents’ mistrust of the government and its spies). Since 1995, the National Youth League and the Students’ Union have had recruitment problems. The membership of the VCP’s youth wing is declining at an alarming rate, and those who do join do so because they want jobs or privileges, not out of enthusiasm or love for Marxism. The youth turn a deaf ear to the party’s calls for sacrifice for the good of the country. One only has to read the works of Baûo Ninh, Phuøng Quaùn, Buøi Minh Quoác and the interviews given by Döông Thu Höông to see how disillusioned and bitter the young people of Viet Nam have become with their leaders. The Politburo is not indifferent to this attitude and Pham Vaên Ñoàng, Leâ Khaõ Phieâu, Phan Vaên Khaûi and others have spent considerable time denouncing the social ills that plague the country, the harmful influence of capitalism…

As in China, and to a greater extent, the generation gap is a real concern. The older people cling to the memory of their heroic struggle for independence under the red banner. They find it hard to adapt to the rapidly changing post-war era. As for the young people, they grew up without hate and resentment, and are more interested in defining who they are than in some vague ideologies. Young and old are not on the same wavelength. In many homes, they clash. Fortunately, family traditions are still strong enough to keep disagreements under control.

For all these reasons, the transition is not without problems, both inside Vieät Nam and out. The question is - does the older generation have a torch to pass? What experience and what messages are being inherited? Is the new generation ready? And who is the new generation? What are their links with the mother country? And if there is no torch to pass, what should the new generation do ?

So many questions. In any case, we are not recommending that the youth sit passively waiting for this hypothetical torch. The situation in Vieät Nam is too urgent for such inaction. To wait for an allied power to give us the green light is out of question too. The youth of Viet Nam has to get going, it has to be aware of the rightness of its cause, and also of the difficulty of its mission. Its strength will be based on its faith and the openness of its mind. The older generation has the duty to lend its support, give its trust. In other words, "passing the torch" is not crucial, it may or may not happen. The heart of the matter is the will of our young people to commit themselves to the cause. They hold in their hands the key to democratization and to economic rebirth. They include both those who live in the diaspora and those who fight against authoritarianism inside Vieät Nam. A bridge must be built between these two groups who are working towards the same goal – rebuild a free Viet Nam on new foundations. What sets these two groups apart is that they live in different environments, with different opportunities, but they share the same shame, the underdevelopment of the mother country. As for the children of the elite, they are a minority and will be quickly swept aside by the popular uprising.

Evolution is the traditional way of change for the Vietnamese. It is characterized by a gradual reform of the structures. A sudden, soviet-style demise of the party in the next decade is improbable, according to many experts, but not impossible - in the rural areas where poverty and corruption are rampant, a new uprising against local people’s committees can happen at any time. The urban areas are attracting more and more peasants in search of work, and are getting more and more congested, with the rate of unemployment steadily rising. Among the young, the ones who are educated and yearning for fundamental changes are getting restless. Religious groups and dissident communists are constantly criticizing those in power. There are countless social ills. The government is powerless to block the information that pours in through the radio and the Internet. The PCV is no longer able to live off its past military victories. Its legitimacy now depends on the effectiveness of its economic policies and whether or not it can generate prosperity for the country. How long can a one-party regime withstand these pressures before giving way to a pluralist democratic system? We don’t know. What is certain is that economic and political change will take time.

Hoà Chí Minh and his followers used to say that the people and the party were one. Today, the party is moving away from the people and the people wants nothing to do with the party. Marxist-Leninism is a façade behind which the red mafia is working overtime to preserve its powers and privileges. The people is voiceless.

The Cold War ended years ago. Viet Nam is a syndrome of the past, a disinherited nation begging for assistance from a free world. The irony is that its leaders are so afraid of the consequences of "peaceful evolution" and so obsessed with maintaining "stability" that they refuse to adopt the economic and political reforms required before aid is given. Without these reforms, Viet Nam will soon fall far behind the other ASEAN countries slowly emerging from the monetary crisis.

The 9^th Party Plenum meeting next March will plan the next five to ten years. With Secretary General Leâ Khaõ Phieâu’s assurances that Viet Nam will always remain faithful to socialism and to Hoà, the Vietnamese are not looking forward to anything new any time soon.