Let's look at China first. There is a profound ignorance in the West of Chinese realities and of the fundamental political changes that have taken place there in the last twenty years. The American public tends to identify political reform with democratization and to measure progress against one single standard, free and open elections. The reality is that democratization is but one element of political reform, and in countries where basic institutions are lacking, it is not even necessarily among the priorities. In the West and other developed nations, political reform has historically had three ingredients: the establishment of common standards for the rulers, the restructuring of the various government branches, and a strengthening of the institutions that guarantee popular participation in the political process. In the China that Deng Xiaoping inherited in 1978, these elements were simply non-existent.

The profound impact of Deng Xiaoping's political reforms

The economic and political debacle of the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 had played havoc with China's basic institutions, in particular the legal system and bureaucracy. The only forms of political participation were through mass political campaigns and mass violence. Deng was faced with a double task, reform the economy and at the same time rebuild the infrastructure. Democratization was not part of the picture, but under Deng's watch, several fundamental political changes took place.

1- He brought back order within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Mao's dictatorship had destroyed the country's elite, subjecting it to frequent bloody purges and exile. Deng, who had been its victim three times, knew better than anyone else the precarious position the ruling class found itself in. This intense personal insecurity heightened rivalries and made for ferocious power struggles. In February 1980, Deng got the CCP to adopt an extraordinary document entitled "Several principles for the Party's internal policy" which defined the basic rights of membership and established a process of open and competitive succession. The effect was to soften the consequences of political defeat. Deng's two successors, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang, kept their material privileges intact and were guaranteed personal security when they gave up power. Under Deng, the losers were simply excluded from their posts instead of being subjected to vicious, wide-reaching purges, and it was not uncommon to see the victorious side welcome within their ranks supporters of the defeated faction.

2 - Deng also made retirement compulsory and set term limits for party and government officials. From 1982 onwards, ministers, provincial party officials and governors were made to retire at age 65, and their assistants at age 60. All positions within the party and the government were subjected to a limit of two terms. These two measures were very effective in curbing the abuse of personal power and accelerated the rise of the new generation. Almost overnight, the generation of aging, uneducated revolutionaries was replaced by middle-aged technocrats.

Until 1982, most ministers and vice- ministers within the State Council were around 64 years of age and only 37% had graduated from college.ministers within the State Council After the new system was introduced, the average age went down to 58 and the proportion of college-educated officials increased to 52%. A similar change took place within the party's Central Committee: in the space of fifteen years, the average age went from 59 to 56 and the proportion of college-educated officials went up from 55% to 92%. In the rural areas, where the average age for party secretaries and governors was 62 in 1982, it was 55 one year later and has remained under 55 since. The proportion of college graduates went from 20% in 1982 to 79% in 1996². The contrast with the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev is stunning: Brezhnev's policy of "cadre stability" had led to political and economic stagnation in the 70's and 80's. In the USSR, 80% to 89% of office-holders of the Communist Party are re-elected each Congress, compared to just 41% in China in 1987. One had to wait till June 1987 to see the introduction by Gorbachev of a system of compulsory retirement, at age 70³.

3 - Deng reduced the potential for conflict within the party. This was another consequence of the compulsory retirement measure. One of the CCP's main mistakes in the 50's was to keep the first generation of revolutionaries too long in their posts, thereby frustrating the ambitions of the younger generation. Mao was able to exploit this discontent to his advantage during the Cultural Revolution. Under Deng, the younger people were able to succeed naturally without resorting to political intrigues. The new class of leaders was also becoming more homogeneous: the combination of a college education and the new age limit was creating a group who shared the same social experience and common political aspirations. The generational and ideological conflict common under Mao was substantially reduced.

Deng also adopted a system of limited competition for party positions in order to prevent the rise of extreme ideologies. Introduced in 1987, ostensibly to democratize party ranks, this measure ensures that the number of candidates running for delegates to the party congress is 20% greater than that of those needed. Similarly, the number of candidates to party offices and posts within the Central Committee has to be 5% higher than that of the vacancies. While this measure did little to democratize the party, it did prevent the rise of radical liberals and conservatives. An indirect consequence was that the children of this first generation of leaders - called the "princelings" - were kept from getting elected to these posts, and from the mid-90's they had disappeared completely from the political scene. Deng's reforms also contributed to the stable transition of power to Jiang. The ruling class after Deng was able to compromise over its political conduct and on personal matters without resorting to unorthodox practices.

4- Restructuring the state without harming the party's power was Deng's ultimate ambition. This was not an easy task and it did not rally unanimous support. The reforms involved were technically complex and threatened entrenched interests. However, with China moving simultaneously towards market economy and a more decentralized political system, it was imperative to redefine the division of powers between the various branches, and preferably to codify it in the constitution.

The challenges facing Deng were unknown to Western democracies where the constitutional and institutional infrastructure was already in place before economic take-off. Property was secured and the execution of contracts guaranteed by a clear division of powers. Economic development in the West also took place at a relatively leisurely pace, with plenty of time for the political institutions to adjust and adapt to changes. China in the late 70's lacked the basic institutions necessary for the development of a healthy market economy. There was no rule of law, no clear definition and division of powers. Unlike the West, China has had to restructure its institutions and modernize its economy at the same time.

China's breathless economic development has intensified the clashes between central and provincial authorities, and between the state and society. It took the US 47 years to double its per capita income; China, only 9, and within 18 years, this figure has quadrupled. Behind this success can be found massive socio-economic dislocation, sweeping changes in values and beliefs and mounting pressure on the political system to establish more appropriate institutions. The government continues to proclaim the supremacy of the party but has had to give in to a number of limited institutional reforms. These reforms, if implemented properly, will have a profound impact on the country. Two deserve a closer look.

A- The growing authority of the National People's Congress (NPC). Under Deng, the NPC has emerged as a potential challenger to the CCP. In the last few years, the NPC has been flexing its political muscle as the supreme legislative body in China. Without ever attacking the CCP directly, the Congress has initiated its own bills, carried out vigorous discussions, made amendments and occasionally, blocked or rejected important bills. The Congress has made use of its power to confirm or reject nominations made by the party to senior executive posts, much to the embarrassment of the party leadership. During the March 1995 session, one third of the deputies publicly opposed the nomination of a member of the Politburo to the post of vice premier. To demonstrate their dissatisfaction about the spread of crime and corruption, 32% of the deputies voted against the Supreme Court's annual report.

In the provinces, the gap between the legislative and the party is more visible. In 1988, a limited system of competitive "selections" was introduced to enable members of provincial congresses to nominate their own candidates to run against CCP nominees. CCP nominees are routinely confirmed as governors and vice-governors but for minor posts, party candidates have been known to be rejected. Statistically, in 20% of the provinces, 155 of officials are elected in this manner.

The NPC's growing independence has added to its credibility. A survey published in The Far Eastern Economic Review in late 1994 shows that more and more Chinese citizens are looking to the NPC to air their grievances. 22% say that they would contact their deputies with a complaint, an increase of 13% since 1988.

The decentralization of power has enabled the NPC to claim its legitimate role as legislator. The appointment of many political heavyweights to its Standing Committee has also given it added bargaining power. This is true in the provinces too, where many retired party secretaries and former governors have become chairpersons of people's congresses. The typical profile of an NPC deputy has changed substantially since 1978. The number of non-affiliated deputies has risen slightly between 1978 and 1993. In 1993, the average deputy is about 53 years old and relatively well educated (69% have a college degree). More importantly, the NPC is now less representative of the soldiers, peasants and workers who form the base of the party's support, and more representative of intellectuals and government workers (from 28% to 50%), thus demonstrating the increased status of technocrats and professionals.

B- The reforms undertaken by the government to ensure that the excesses of the Cultural Revolution are not repeated and to lay down the legal foundations of market economy are another significant development. The NPC enacted 175 laws between 1978 and 1994. Local people's congresses enacted 3000. On paper, Chinese laws borrow liberally from Western doctrines, concepts, procedures and terminology. Although only half of the judgments passed in business matters are executed, growing numbers of businessmen and ordinary citizens are relying on the judicial system to look after their property and private rights.

There are currently three types of class actions before Chinese tribunals: commercial (contractual disputes), administrative (mostly against the government) and civilian. From 1986 to 1996, commercial actions increased by 387%, administrative actions by 12,483% and civilian actions by 212%. A 1993 survey shows that 78% of the population believe that "property is sacred and should not be violated", and 77% disagree that "in a trial case between an individual and a group, the judgment must come down in favor of the group". 47% disagree (and 28% agree) that "the police is justified in detaining a person for reasons of public security even if his or her guilt has not been established".

This trend towards legality cannot be reversed by the CCP. It benefits too many important groups - private entrepreneurs, foreign investors, a growing bourgeoisie, all of which would fight for their interests. Another positive factor is the growth of the legal profession (31,000 in 1988, 90,000 in 1985). All these developments constitute an indirect challenge to the CCP. Open elections or multipartism would challenge the party directly whereas gradual legal reforms do not represent an immediate danger and are therefore less threatening. They will seamlessly evolve into the rule of law.

Why is Beijing shunning democracy ?

Before Deng, Chinese prisons were similar to Soviet gulags. Between 1953 and 1975, 26% to 39% of prisoners were classified as counter-revolutionaries. This figure fell to 13% in 1980 and to 0.5% in 1989. "Counter-revolutionary" offenses were legally abolished last year. According to official figures, since 1997, the number of prisoners held for "crimes endangering national security" has been 2, 026, 0.4% of the prison population. Under Deng, the CCP moved from mass repression to the "selective repression" of specific individuals.

Chinese leaders have been resisting democracy because they feel personally threatened but also because they are aware of the weakness of the party and the great vulnerability of the regime. The roles and powers of the various branches remain ill defined and the political institutions necessary for conflict management are non-existent or inadequate. To open the door to popular participation in these conditions is to invite chaos. Many believe that Gorbachev's great mistake was to initiate political reform before changing the economy. This view misses the most important point, which is that Gorbachev invited democratic political participation without first consolidating the institutions governing this kind of participation. Democratic reforms unleashed forces which overran the government in place. Beijing does not want a repeat of this scenario.

The CCP's decline as an organization is plain for all to see. It is still the largest party in the world, with 58 million members organized in 3.4 million cells (according to 1997 statistics). But Tienanmen has shaken it to the core and forced it to re-evaluate Deng's heritage. Chinese society today is vastly different from the one that emerged from the Cultural Revolution: less dependent on the state and the party, more open to new values, less receptive to ideological appeals. Economic reforms have eroded the CCP's organization in many ways. In 1994, in 35% of the state-owned factories, there wasn't one single party member. The party has also not been able to establish a strong presence within the rising private sector. In 1994, a survey of 3,092 partially state-owned companies in 34 zones of economic development shows that there were party cells in only 704. The worst crisis for the CCP has been its decomposition in the rural areas. The dismantling of people's communes from 1980 to 1982 has dealt it a harsh blow. On paper, the party still has 26 million members in 900,000 rural cells. In reality, 8% of these cells are non-functioning or have collapsed altogether and 60% are functioning below par*. New mobility and better opportunities have contributed to this decline. The CCP cannot afford to allocate more resources to its rural infrastructure and this has made a career within the party a great deal less attractive to local cadres. Today, a communist village leader is paid 1,000 yuans, about US$ 120 a year. The younger generation is drifting toward the cities. Those who stay are older, less educated, less knowledgeable about market economy. 1995 figures show that only 12% of the village leaders are under 35 and half of the party members in the rural areas cannot read. This sorry situation is the source of great tension and corruption and gang activitiy is rife. Peasants in Guizhou and Sichuan have risen in frustration and burned down the houses of the local authorities. In the long run, the CCP is losing its rural support.

What about Viet Nam?

Since 1975, the Vietnamese communists, lacking as always in political imagination and initiative, have been looking to Beijing for a solution to their ideological and economic impasse. The 1979 conflict between the two countries did not dent their admiration for China in any way. It is true that these two communist countries share many problems, but Viet Nam's situation is worse because there is more internal division and there are no leaders of Deng, Jiang or Zhu Rongji's caliber. Corruption, regionalism, partisanship, the sorry state of the education system and of the environment are several of the problems Hanoi has been grappling with.

Even more than in China, the peasantry throughout Viet Nam is in a great state of discontent. In many areas, they have taken to the streets, they clash with the authorities, they publicly protest against local taxes and malpractice by communist cadres. The situation is no better in urban areas, plagued by unemployment and prostitution. The gap between rich and poor is widening. Workers, intellectuals, students are in ferment. Religious groups complain about persecution. Critics inside the party and out are becoming more aggressive and vocal.

The greatest pressure comes from foreign investors who are impatient with the slowness of the government's economic reforms and Viet Nam's financial deterioration. The rate of capital investment has gone down by 40%, the piaster has devaluated by 10%, exports and tourism have decreased, and the 6000 state-owned companies are in heavy deficit. And how does Hanoi deal with these problems? By appointing Vice Premier and security chief Nguyen Tien Dung to the post of governor of the National Bank, in spite of his lack of economic experience, and by making the study of Marxism and Ho-ism compulsory!

* * *

The survival of a regime depends on popular support, not on the machinations of the rulers. Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea and Burma illustrate this point. Whether they like it or not, China and Viet Nam will have to democratize and join the global village. Asked by the foreign press when democracy would come to China, Jiang Zemin, echoed by Le Kha Phieu, said "in the space of fifteen years". The Chinese and Vietnamese people may not be prepared to wait that long.

References:

1. " Weaving the Net - Conditional Engagement with China " by James Shinn, published by The Council on Foreign Affairs Press Inc., New York, 1996. "US-China relations after Deng Xiaoping" by Lam Le Trinh in Reflets d'Asie, Institut de l'Asie du Sud-Est, Summer 1997, Paris.

2. "Is China democratizing ? " by Minxin Pei in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1998, pp. 68-82.

3. "Gorbachev's first year" by Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann in Problems of Communism, May/June 1986, p.4

LAM LE TRINH

Thuy Hoa Trang

Huntington Beach, California